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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether this Court may disturb the weight given

to the evidence by the trial court in making findings of fact
determining that defendants built their

fence

and

deposited

dirt and debris on plaintiff's property.
2.
court

applied

On plaintiff's cross
erroneous

legal

appeal, whether the trial

standards

in determining that

plaintiff was not entitled to punitive damages or attorneys'
fees

for

defendants' trespass

and for defendants' continued

defense of this action in reliance on a survey establishing the
trespass.
3.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

awarding plaintiff the costs of a survey found by the trial
court to be necessary for the determination

of the property

rights of both plaintiff and defendants.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 7, 1985, after the filing of defendants' brief
here, the trial court entered its Order awarding plaintiff the
costs

complained

of

in

defendants'

brief,

after

having

announced its decision on this issue by minute entry entered on
March

6,

1985, previous to the filing of defendants' brief.

Neither the Order nor the minute entry have yet been made part
of the record on appeal here.
dispute the statement
brief.

of the

Otherwise, plaintiff does not
case

contained

in defendants'

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Introduction
The statement of facts in defendants' brief contains
only general factual background that is generally not disputed
by plaintiff.

Defendants' statement of facts does not contain

the factual basis
relied

upon

by

for this appeal, and instead, the "facts"

defendants

on

this

appeal

are

interspersed

throughout the argument portion of defendants' brief.

Accord-

ingly, this Court should accept the factual

in the

recitals

argument portion of defendants' brief for what they purport to
be—argument, not "facts."
The facts of this matter are set forth comprehensively
in the trial court's Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact,
which include an exhaustive analysis of all evidence presented
by both plaintiff

and defendants.

Neither

the statement of

facts nor argument portions of defendants' brief contend that
there are serious errors or omissions

in the trial

court's

findings, except to argue that the trial court gave improper
weight to surveys offered into evidence by plaintiff that used
a certain
marks.
found

steel pipe as one of the control points or land-

Accordingly, what follows is a summary of the facts
by

References

the

trial

court

to the Record

and

not

disputed

by defendants.

on Appeal will be designated

"R."

followed by the page number in the record, except that references to the trial

transcript

-2-

("Tr." -

which

commences

at

R. 234) will be to the transcript page number; references to
trial exhibits ("Ex"

- See R. 6, 94-94A) will be by exhibit

number; and references to the trial court's Findings of Fact
("Findings" - which commence at R. 168) will be by paragraph
number.

Copies of the Findings, as well as the trial court's

Memorandum Decision ("Memorandum Decision" - See R.
and Judgment

("Judgment" - See R.

116-141)

190-193) are appended to

defendants' brief on file and will not be separately appended
here.
History of Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2
and Relevant Surveys
Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2 (hereinafter "Little
Mountain") and

Killyons

Subdivision

(hereinafter

"Killyons")

are located in Emigration Canyon, Section 27, TIN, R2E, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian.
Killyons.

Little Mountain lies to the south of

E. G. Swenson, the then Salt Lake County Surveyor,

platted both subdivisions.

In 1909 Swenson recorded the sub-

division plat for Killyons in the Salt Lake County Recorder's
office, and in 1910 he recorded the subdivision plat for Little
Mountain in that office.

Copies of those plats are appended to

defendants' brief and will not be separately

appended here.

The beginning point for Little Mountain, as stated in the plat,
is the southwest corner of Section 27.

The beginning point for

Killyons, as stated in the recorded plat of that subdivision,
is the northwest corner of Section 27.
Ex. P-13, P-14.

Findings, 1(1; Tr. 45;

Plaintiff (sometimes referred to herein as "Hatanaka")
is the owner of Lots 39, 40 and the northerly half of Lot 41 in
Little Mountain.

The recorded Little Mountain Subdivision plat

shows that Hatanaka's property has an east side frontage of
252.16

feet.

Defendants

(sometimes

referred

to

herein

as

"Struhs") are the owners of Lots 37 and 38 in Little Mountain
and Lot 1 in Killyons.

Hatanaka's Lot 39 lies directly to the

south of and shares a common boundary line with the Struhs' Lot
38.

It is the

factual

issue

location of this boundary

in dispute.

purchase in 1966.

Hatanaka

line that

is the

acquired his Lot 39 by

The Struhs acquired their Lot 38 by a quit

claim deed dated June 27, 1962.

Findings; inr 2-4; Tr. 24;

Ex. P-l.
When Section 27 was originally surveyed by the Bureau
of Land Management
field notes

(hereinafter

(Ex. P-28)

"BLM") in 1881, the original

state that

a sandstone monument was

placed at the southwest corner of Section 27.
monument

has

independent
office.

never

been

surveyors

and

located,
the

although

Salt

Lake

This sandstone

searched
County

for

by

Surveyor's

Also the Little Mountain plat does not refer to such a

monument, or to the BLM survey.

Findings 1fir 1,5; Tr. 111-120,

241; Ex. P-13, P-14, P-29.
The original BLM field notes contain calls from the
southwest corner of Section 27 of five chains east to the road
and

6.5

chains east to Emigration

-4-

Creek.

The Swenson plat

conforms to these same calls in fixing the beginning point of
Little Mountain.

The BLM field notes also show distances along

the west boundary line of Section 27, north from its southwest
corner, of two chains to conglomerate rock, four chains to a 50
foot high wall, 18 chains to the top of a north-south ridge, 40
chains to a point where a sandstone marker 16" x 9M x 8" was
set for the west 1/4 corner by which a mound of stones was
erected, and 80 chains to the corner for Sections 21, 22, 27
and 28 (the northwest corner of 27) where a limestone monument
14" x 9" x 6M was set with stated markings and a stone mound
alongside.

Findings, 1f 6; Ex. P-13, P-14, P-28, P-29.

At some uncertain time

in the past, the Salt Lake

County Surveyor inserted a 6M x 6" cedar post in the ground and
declared it to be the southwest corner of Section 27.

However,

if the cedar post is used as the beginning point of Little
Mountain, the entire subdivision

is shifted

from

its actual

location to the east approximately 107 feet and to the north
approximately six feet, leaving the homes of some of the owners
of the west lots of the subdivision outside of, or upon the
west boundary line of, the subdivision.

The use of the cedar

post as the beginning point of the subdivision would result in
Hatanaka's house no longer being situated on his property.

The

Salt Lake County Surveyor's office has done no work to locate
the platted beginning point
corners

in

Little

Mountain

of
and

Little
no

Mountain
work

in

or
an

any

lot

east-west

direction to compare the

location of the cedar post to the

location of the southwest corner of Section 27, as identified
in the original BLM field notes.

However, the Salt Lake County

Surveyor and all parties and witnesses agree that the 6M x 6"
cedar post does not accurately locate the southwest corner of
Section 27 or the beginning point of Little Mountain.

Find-

ings, 1Mf 7-9; Tr. 135-138; Defendants' Brief at 22.
The Utah State Department of Transportation (hereinafter "DOT") performed a survey of Emigration Canyon between
1932 and 1936.

The DOT field notes

incorporate the original

relating to

its survey

BLM notes, and are consistent with

these notes and the Little Mountain plat, including the calls
from the southwest corner of Section 27 of east five chains to
the road and 6.5 chains to Emigration Creek.

During the course

of this survey, the state surveyors found the cedar post which
had been installed by Salt Lake County and used it strictly as
a tie to monuments for road stations.

Findings, 1MF 10-12, Tr.

93-120; Ex. P-24 through P-31.
The DOT survey determined that the beginning point of
Little Mountain was approximately 100 feet west and six feet
north of the cedar post.
right

of

Mountain
field

way

map)

DOT survey Drawing No. G-9 7 (the

located

the

beginning

point

of

Little

in accordance with its survey and the original BLM

notes.

The

procedure

used

-6-

by

DOT

in

locating

the

beginning point of Little Mountain was that used in locating an
obliterated monument.

The distance from the point of beginning

of Little Mountain to the road, as shown in the DOT'S right of
way map, conforms to the distance from the point of beginning
of

the

subdivision

to

the

road,

as

shown

recorded subdivision plat for Little Mountain.

on the original
The DOT'S right

of way map of Little Mountain sets forth the boundary lines of
the lots of the subdivision based upon the DOT'S location of
the beginning point of Little Mountain (i.e., approximately 100
feet west and six feet north of the cedar post).

Legal docu-

ments by which the State of Utah purchased and condemned right
of way property in Little Mountain contain descriptions based
upon the location of the beginning point of Little Mountain as
determined and drawn by the DOT in the right of way map.

Find-

ings 1f1f 13-16; Tr. 120-140, 161; Ex. P-24 through P-31.
Use of the Steel Pipe as a Control Point
The

DOT'S

right of way map shows a steel pipe of

unknown origin located at the northwest corner of Lot 25 in
Little Mountain.
Mountain

The southwest

is contiguous to

the

corner

of Lot 26

northwest

corner

of

in Little
Lot 25.

Norman Andreason purchased Lot 26 in Little Mountain (located
on the east side of the canyon roadway) in September, 1949, and
the steel pipe was in place at the southwest corner of Lot 26
at the time of purchase.
of

Bush

Since 1951, the land surveying firms

& Gudgell, Coon, King

and

Knowlton,

and Larsen &

Malmquist have made a number of surveys of properties in Little
Mountain (including surveys of plaintiff's property) utilizing
the steel pipe as a control point.

These surveys have recog-

nized the steel pipe as being located at the northwest corner
of Lot 25 of the subdivision.

Findings, 1f1f 17-19; Tr. 82,

138-141; Ex. P-16, P-17, P-22, P-23.
Under

these

surveys

the

location

of

properties

in

Little Mountain fits existing conditions, including the roadway, houses and other structures

(such as the homes of John

McMillian, Jr., William F, Biggs, Norman Andreason and plaintiff Hatanaka), a concrete retaining wall on the west side of
the roadway (which is tied to the steel pipe in the real estate
contract pursuant to which Biggs acquired the lower one-half of
Lot 50 and the upper one-half of Lot 51), and the fence that
surrounds the property of John McMillian, Jr., encompassing the
north one-half of Lot 50, Lots 49, 48, 47, 46, 45, 44, 43, 42,
and the lower one-half of Lot 41.

A number of recorded deeds

conveying property within Little Mountain, including deeds to
and from Salt Lake County in the late 1940* s and early 1950's,
utilize the steel pipe as a reference point and identify it as
being

located

Mountain.

at the northwest

corner

of Lot 25 of Little

The steel pipe has been used as a marker for surveys

in Little Mountain for more than 45 years, including surveys
performed

for

John

McMillian,

Jr.,

who

owns

the

property

immediately to the south of plaintiff, and William F. Biggs,

-8-

who owns the property immediately to the south of McMillian.
Findings, 1f1f 20-22; Ex. P-52 through P-60.
All of the above surveys have tied the steel pipe back
to the cedar post and have determined that the location of the
cedar post does not conform to the location of the beginning
point of the Little Mountain subdivision as set forth on the
recorded plat.

These surveys

also have determined

that the

Little Mountain beginning point is approximately 107 feet to
the west and six to seven feet to the north of the cedar post.
The

beginning

point

of

Little

Mountain

as

thus

determined

closely conforms to the location of the subdivision beginning
point set forth in the DOT'S 1936 survey.

In addition, the

distances from this point to the road and to Emigration Creek
compare closely to the distances from the southwest corner of
Section 27 to the road and creek as stated in the original BLM
field notes.

Findings, 1Mf 23-24; Tr. 214-229; Ex. P-28, P-29,

P-52 through P-60.
If the distances from the southwest corner of Section
27 east to the road and creek as identified in the original BLM
notes are measured from the cedar post, then the road and creek
would be situated where they are not actually located.

If the

cedar post is used as the beginning point of Little Mountain
then the northwest corner of Lot 25 would be pushed up the
canyon 75 to 90 feet from the present location of the steel
pipe.

Findings, 1f1f 25-26; Tr. 214-229.

In January,

1983, Robert Jones, a licensed surveyor

employed by Bush & Gudgell, performed a survey for plaintiff
Hatanaka to determine the location of the boundary line between
defendants' Lot 38 and plaintiff's

Lot 39.

In making this

survey, Jones utilized

the steel pipe as the horizontal or

lateral control point.

James Schuchert, a licensed

surveyor

employed by Coon, King & Knowlton, and Carl Larsen, a licensed
surveyor
surveys

employed

by

Larsen

and

Malmquist,

also

performed

for plaintiff which utilized

the steel pipe as the

horizontal or lateral control point.

Each of these surveys

located the disputed boundary line in the same location and are
also consistent with the original BLM field notes.

In perform-

ing these surveys, the surveyors concluded that the steel pipe
was

located

at

the

northwest

corner

Mountain, as originally platted.

of

Lot

25

of

Little

Findings, 1f 28; Tr. 189-230;

Ex. P-39 through P-42, P-61, P-62.
Carl

Larsen, while

an

employee of Bush

& Gudgell,

performed a survey for defendants Struhs in May, 1962, utilizing the steel pipe as the horizontal or lateral control point.
Although stakes were installed by Larsen on the boundary line
between Lots 38 and 39, no survey plat was made because defendants

instructed

Bush

& Gudgell

not to certify

Again, this Larsen survey conforms to the BLM
Findings, 1f 27, Tr. 302-307.

-10-

the survey.
field notes.

Evidence Regarding The Trespass by Struhs
In

1979, defendants

Struhs

installed

a chain

link

fence which ran north and south along the easterly line of the
subdivision lots lying west of Emigration Canyon Road.

From

its southern most point near the west side of Emigration Canyon
Road, this fence runs in a westerly direction approximately 45
feet.

Defendants did not use the boundary stakes, which had

been installed for them by Bush & Gudgell in 1962, to determine
their

property

line.

These stakes established

the disputed

boundary line at the same location as did the surveys performed
by Bush & Gudgell
Hatanaka.

and Coon, King & Knowlton, for plaintiff

Also, in 1984 defendants placed a substantial amount

of fill dirt on the northerly side of this 45-foot section of
fence.

The bearing of this 45-foot section of fence is S 88°

30' W, while the bearing on the south line of Lot 38 on the
original Little Mountain Subdivision Plat is N 79° 08' West.
Findings, 1Mf 28,30; Tr. 29-32, 39, 44, 57-59. Ex. P-19, P-20,
P-21.
Defendants Struhs have asserted that they built their
house on Lot 37 in 1965, making their determination as to the
location of their property from "existing land marks and topography."

However, the building permit and proof of appropria-

tion of water

filed by defendants

establish that defendants

built their house on Lot 38 and the lower part of Lot 37, both
of

which

they

own.

These

documents

show,

respectively,

defendants' house to be only approximately either 40 feet north
or 25 feet north of the common boundary line between Lots 38
and 39.

Findings, 1f 31; Ex. P-86.
The survey

introduced

at trial by defendants Struhs

was performed by James Stercke, a licensed surveyor.

Stercke's

survey purports to locate the common line between Lots 38 and
39 in Little Mountain by measurements made from the presumed
beginning point of Killyons.
assumed that the present

In performing his survey, Stercke

Salt

Lake

County

monument

at

the

northwest corner of Section 27 was the point of beginning of
Killyons and that Killyons and Little Mountain were contiguous,
as originally platted.

However, several witnesses testified at

trial, and defendants' brief admits, that the two subdivisions
may overlap, rather than being contiguous, with Struhs owning
the property on both sides of the overlap.

Although Lot 1 in

Killyons lies north of defendants' Lot 37, and the south line
of Lot 1 and the north line of Lot 37 have the same bearings,
the two subdivisions have separate points of beginning, making
it clear that when Swenson surveyed and platted the two subdivisions in 1909 and 1910, he did not begin Little Mountain
where Killyons ended at Lot 1.

Findings 1Mf 32, 35; Tr. 238,

248; Ex. D-88.
The

trial

court

found

that

the

evidence

did

not

establish that the monument used by Stercke as his beginning
point is located either at the point where the original BLM

-12-

notes describe the location of the northwest corner of Section
27, or at the point of beginning of Killyons, as originally
platted.

Stercke's survey is uncertified and Stercke made no

attempt to locate the beginning point of Little Mountain, or to
follow the original BLM field notes.
other

surveys

of

any

other

Stercke has performed no

property

in

Little

Mountain.

Stercke did not locate the west one-quarter corner of Section
27 or any of the other section corners he attempted to find.
Findings, 1fir 33-34; Tr. 248, 448-458; Ex. D-88.
Stercke performed his survey for defendants
fall

of

1983.

Defendant

Kenneth

Struhs

Stercke installed a stake in the ground
believed

to be the southeast

corner

was

in the

present

at a point

when

Stercke

of defendants' Lot 38.

This stake was placed about 20 feet north of the southeast
corner of defendants' fence.

Stercke advised defendant Kenneth

Struhs at the time of installing this stake that the stake was
installed where Stercke believed the southeast corner of Lot 38
was located.

Thus, even according to the survey relied upon by

Struhs at trial, the Struhs' fence and fill dirt were located
on Hatanaka's property.

Also under Stercke's survey, the road-

way through Little Mountain would be shifted about 50 feet west
into the west lots of the subdivision
would be in the platted road.

and defendants' house

Findings, 1f1f 36, 37; Tr. 465;

Ex. P-65, P-90.

- i -3-

The survey performed for plaintiff Hatanaka by James
C. Schuchert shows that plaintiff's house is situated 86.4 feet
from the south line of the north 1/2 of Lot 41 and 64.3 feet
west of the east line with the north side of the house 134 feet
from the north line of Lot 39.
defendants'
northeast

chain

corner

link

fence

This survey also shows that

extends

77

feet

south

of

of Lot 39 on to plaintiffs' property.

the
The

survey performed for plaintiff by Carl Larsen shows that defendants' fence lies about five feet east of the east boundary of
Lots 37, 38, and 39 and borders the west side of the roadway.
The distance between the McMillian fence to the south of plaintiff's property and the fence line of defendants to the north
is only 175 feet.

At the south end of defendants' fence, the

fence turns westward into Lot 39 upon a bearing of S 88° 30'
W.

Since the platted south line of Lot 38 has a bearing of N

79° 08' W, the distance that the fence extends down into Lot 39
varies from 80 feet where the fence turns westward to 90 feet
where the fence terminates.
The

survey

Findings 1f 38-39; Ex. P-64, P-65.

performed

for plaintiff

by Robert

Jones

shows that defendants' chain link fence runs southward 79 feet
from the dividing line between Lots 38 and 39 along the west
side of the roadway and then angles into Lot 39 for a distance
of 44.9 feet in such a direction that the west end of the fence
is eight feet north from the south line of Lot 39 or about 92

-14-

feet south from the north line of Lot 39.

Findings, 1f 40;

Tr. 230; Ex. P-39.
Also, plaintiff and defendant Kenneth Struhs measured
the distance of the frontage of plaintiff's

land along the

roadway between the McMillian fence on the south and defendants' fence on the north.

This distance was 73 feet short of

the 252.16 feet of east side frontage contained in plaintiff's
property,

according

to

the

original

Little

Mountain

plat.

Aside from Stercke's survey, defendants presented no proof as
to where their lots or their corners are actually located or
that

defendants'

east

side

frontage,

as

shown

on

Little

Mountain plat, will be reduced by giving plaintiff 252.16 feet
of

frontage on the east side of plaintiff's lots commencing

from McMillian's fence.

Findings, 1f 41-42; Tr. 29.

Accordingly, the trial court found that,

M

[i]n con-

structing their fence, defendants were more concerned with the
placement

of McMillian's

tract of

land they

plaintiff's

lots

fence and undertook to fence off a

considered
and

the

their

east

own without

side

frontage

regard

to

thereof.'1

Ultimately, the trial court also found that defendants' chain
link fence extends along the frontage of plaintiff's Lot 39 by
at least 73 feet, and in its turn to the west it intrudes into
Lot 39 for the length of the fence.

Findings, 1f 44.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

As to the merits of

their

appeal, the

Struhs

contend that the trial court erred in failing to relocate (or
in failing to order the county surveyor to relocate) the spot
upon which the BLM surveyor erected a sandstone monument in
1881 to mark the southwest corner of Section 27.
issue

is not

where

the

BLM

found

the

However, the

southwest

corner of

Section 27 to be in 1881, the issue is where E. G. Swenson
commenced

Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2 pursuant to the

subdivision plat he recorded in 1910.

This is an issue of fact

upon which this Court may not substitute its judgment for that
of the trial court.
Contrary to the cases relied upon by defendants, their
property rights do not flow from government patent or any other
deed or grant of land referencing or incorporating either the
sandstone monument or the BLM survey.

Instead, these property

rights flow from the Swenson subdivision plat, which recites
that

the

subdivision

commences

at

the

southwest

corner

of

Section 27, but which contains no mention of the sandstone
monument, the 1881 BLM survey, or any other
used

by

Swenson

in commencing

the

reference point

subdivision

at what

he

believed to be the southwest corner of Section 27.
While
probative,
indicates

the

BLM

survey

is

because

the

Little

Mountain

that

Swenson

did

not

attempt to
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controlling,
Plat

on

its

it

is
face

locate the beginning

point of the subdivision in accordance with where the BLM notes
described the location of the southwest corner of Section 27.
In this regard, all of the surveys relied upon by plaintiff
also relied on the BLM field notes and recreated the BLM survey
from those field notes, when the sandstone monument referenced
in the BLM survey could not be found.
In retracing the BLM survey from the field notes, all
of these surveyors discovered that the pipe was located at the
northwest corner of Lot 25, as the lot and the subdivision had
been platted by Swenson.

Since the pipe could be tied both to

the BLM survey and the Swenson plat, and since the BLM's sandstone monument could not be located, the pipe was appropriately
used for a control point.
sistent

with

the

Plaintiff's surveys were also con-

"fit" of other

landmarks

and

improvements

within the subdivision and were a proper basis for the trial
court's decision fixing the location of the disputed boundary.
On the other hand, the survey relied upon by defendants at trial ignored the BLM survey and field notes and was
tied only to the location of a neighboring subdivision based on
the mistaken belief that the two subdivisions were contiguous.
Defendants'

survey was

also

inconsistent

Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2.

with

the

"fit" of

Moreover, even defendants'

survey showed that defendants' fence and fill dirt were placed
on plaintiff's property.

II.

On the merits of plaintiff's

punitive damages

cross

appeal

for

and attorneys' fees, the trial court found

that defendants placed their fence and fill dirt without regard
for the location of plaintiff's property, and in the face of
their own surveys showing that the property line was well above
the area where they had installed their fence.

At the very

least, their conduct was reckless, and the trial

court com-

mitted an error of law in failing to award punitive damages in
light of the Findings of Fact.

Similarly, defendants' con-

tinued defense of this action with knowledge that their own
surveys

established

the

trespass, entitles

plaintiff

to

an

award of attorneys' fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953)
for defendants' bad faith and meritless defense.
III.

Finally,

defendants

appeal

from

the

award

of

plaintiff's costs of a survey found by the trial court to be
necessary to locate the disputed boundary line.

However, the

order appealed from is not yet part of the record on appeal and
is, therefore, not yet subject to review.

In any event, the

cost award should be upheld based on the trial court's proper
exercise

of

its

discretion

in

finding

that the survey was

necessary.
ARGUMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION - SCOPE OF REVIEW

The trial court correctly described the issue before
it in this boundary dispute-trespass case as the credibility of
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the evidence, primarily consisting of surveys used to determine
the

beginning

Memo r andum

point

of

Little

Decision

at

3.

Mountain

Thus,

in

Subdivision
reviewing

No.

2.

defendants1

contention on appeal that plaintiff did not meet his burden of
proof on this factual issue, this Court must review the factual
record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff-respondent
and may not disturb the weight given by the trial court to the
evidence.

See Reimschiissel v. Russell,

649

P. 2d

26

(Utah

1982); Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang, 613 P.2d 512 (Utah 1980).
Defendants' brief incorrectly implies that the burden
of proof to be met by plaintiff was one of clear and convincing
evidence.

However defendants cite no supporting authority, and

plaintiff is unaware of any authority for application of any
burden of proof in this case other than the usual preponderance
of the evidence standard.
of

clear

and
Id.

appeal.

The only parties who have the burden

convincing

evidence

are

defendants

on

this

Moreover, as will be discussed further below,

plaintiff's burden at trial was to show the beginning point of
a privately platted subdivision, not the location of a missing
governmental monument.
Defendants' brief
the trial

court determined

is also incorrect in stating that
the

rights

of

non-parties.

The

trial court was called upon to determine only the property
rights of the parties before it.

This is not a quiet title

action, and only the rights of plaintiff and defendants were

fixed

by

the

trial

court's

determination

of

the

disputed

boundary and of defendants' trespass.
II.

THE EVIDENCE OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTS THE
TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS DETERMINING THE
DISPUTED BOUNDARY AND DEFENDANTS' TRESPASS.

The three cases primarily relied upon by defendants in
their appeal are Barbizon of Utah, Inc. v. General Oil Co., 24
Utah 2d 321, 471 P.2d 148 (1970); Washington Rock Co. v. Young,
29 Utah 108, 80 P. 382 (1905); and Cornia v. Putnam, 26 Utah 2d
354, 489 P.2d 1001 (1971).

However, a review of these cases

reveal that they actually support plaintiffs position instead.
Defendants rely on Barbizon and Washington Rock for
the propositions that

M

[o]fficial government surveys cannot be

changed in a dispute over boundary lines between individuals,M
and that government surveys and section corner monuments are
the "best evidence" in a private boundary dispute.
dants' Brief at 9-12.

See, Defen-

They rely on Cornia in arguing that the

trial court failed to distinguish between whether the missing
BLM monument at the southwest corner of Section 27 was "lost"
or "obliterated."

See, Defendants' Brief

at 9-10.

However,

the reason this Court found the BLM surveys to be controlling
in resolving the private boundary disputes in these cases was
that the sources of title of the respective parties involved
were federal land patents based on BLM surveys.
at 471 P.2d 148 and Washington Rock at 80 P. 385.
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See, Barbizon

In the case at hand, the source of both plaintiff1 s
and defendants' title is private deeds to numbered lots in a
privately platted subdivision.

Here, the recorded subdivision

plat is the "original'1 survey, since it makes no reference to
the BLM

survey, other

Defendants

correctly

surveys, or
point

out

any

that

government

any

rights

monument.
created

by

"official" government surveys can not be altered by subsequent
private surveys.

By the same token, rights created by private

surveys cannot be altered by inconsistent government surveys,
as the trial court ruled.
also, Tr. 146.
replace

the

See, Memorandum Decision at 22.

Thus, even if the county

missing

BLM

sandstone

surveyor

monument

were

pursuant

See
to
to

§ 17-23-9 Utah Code Ann. (1953), as defendants urge, this would
have no effect on the rights of the parties under a subdivision
plat not tied to that monument.

Defendants concede as much in

admitting that the cedar post presently used by the county surveyor

to mark the southwest

corner

of Section 27 does

not

accurately reflect the beginning point of Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2.
If

See, Defendants' Brief at 22.

Swenson

had used

a commencement

point different

from where the BLM survey found the southwest corner of Section
27 to be, the Swenson survey would still control, because the
Swenson survey is the source of both plaintiff's
dants' title, not the BLM survey.
considered

the BLM

survey

at

all

and defen-

The reason the trial court
in this

private

boundary

dispute is that the evidence indicated that Swenson used the
same "calls" (i.e., 5 chains from the road bisecting the subdivision and 6.5 chains from Emigration Creek) in locating the
beginning point of his subdivision, as were used by the BLM
surveyor in locating the southwest corner of Section 27.

To

this extent, Barbizon, Cornia and Washington Rock become relevant

in

determining

the

probative

value

surveys relied upon by the parties here.
for this Court's

of

the

respective

However, the reason

rejection of the private

surveys

in those

cases is because those surveys ignored the government's surveys
and field notes.

By contrast, here all of the surveys relied

upon by plaintiff (including the DOT survey performed

in the

1930's) used or were consistent with the BLM survey and field
notes,

all

survey.

of

which

Defendants'

were

in turn

ignored

by

the

Stercke

cases establish the probative value of

plaintiff's surveys and the lack of any probative value of the
Stercke survey.
Defendants' description

of this Court's

analysis

in

these cases of the "best evidence" of a government survey, and
the distinction between "lost" government monuments and "obliterated"

government

monuments,

is

extremely

misleading.

In

discussing the "best evidence" of a government survey, these
cases refer to the best available evidence.
monuments

have not been

lost

obviously the best evidence.

or

If the government

obliterated

then

they

are

However, all three of the cases
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make it very clear that if these monuments cannot be found, as
here, then the BLM field notes become the

"best" evidence.

This is the evidence relied upon by plaintiff here and ignored
by defendants.
Cornia also makes it clear that a governmental monument is "lost" rather than "obliterated" only if its original
location cannot be found by use of the government surveyor's
field notes.

If the field notes enable the government survey

to be re-created, then the monument
than

"lost" and the procedure

for

is "obliterated"
re-location

rather

is simply to

re-trace the government survey from the field notes.

The trial

court here expressly found that the DOT surveys, plaintiff's
surveys introduced at trial and all other surveys relied upon
by plaintiff followed or were consistent with the BLM survey
and field notes.

Accordingly, there is no merit to defendants'

contentions that the trial court did not determine whether the
monument at the southwest corner of Section 27 was "lost" or
merely "obliterated," and that plaintiff's surveys were unable
to locate this corner.
The surveys plaintiff relies upon did not replace the
obliterated monument because this

is the job of the county

surveyor under § 17-23-9 and because there was no need to do
so.

The steel pipe referred to in all of these surveys was

tied both to the BLM survey and to the Swenson plat and was
appropriate for use as a control point instead of the missing
monument.

There is nothing in any of the cases cited by defendants to suggest that if the purpose for finding the location
of an obliterated government monument is to resolve a private
boundary dispute, that only the county surveyor is empowered to
perform this task under § 17-23-9.

To the contrary, Barbizon,

Cornia and Washington Rock all indicate that, as here, evidence
of the original location of an obliterated government monument
from private surveyors using original government field notes is
the

"best evidence" of government

location of private boundaries.

surveys used to find the

Resolution of private boundary

disputes cannot be made to depend upon the county surveyor's
performance or nonperformance of § 17-23-9 duties.
Again, it was only defendants' survey which

ignored

the "best evidence" found in the BLM field notes and instead
relied upon the false assumption that the Little Mountain and
Killians subdivision boundaries were contiguous.

It was only

the Stercke survey that ignored the "fit" of all landmarks and
improvements within Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2, to the
extent of shifting the location of defendants' own home into
the platted road.

Since even this survey conclusively estab-

lishes defendants' trespass, there is no basis for disturbing
the weight given to the evidence by the trial court.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
IN FAILING TO AWARD PLAINTIFF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AND ATTORNEYS' FEES BASED UPON DEFENDANTS'
KNOWING TRESPASS.
As set forth in the Statement of Facts above, not only
did the trial court find that defendants placed their fence and
-24-

fill

dirt

on

plaintiff's

property,

the

court

also found a

number of facts showing that defendants acted with knowledge of
the trespass.

These facts are:
1.

A

defendants
with

survey
in

ordered

from

Bush

& Gudgell

1962 showed that the common boundary

plaintiff's

property

tended it to be.

was

where

Findings, 1f 27.

plaintiff

instructed

survey. Id.

Bush

con-

When defendant saw

where their survey showed the property
they

by

line to be,

& Gudgell not to certify the

When defendants installed their fence in

1979, they ignored the boundary stakes set by their
own surveyor and located the fence without regard to
plaintiff's property line.
2.

Findings, 1f1f 30, 44.

In building permit

applications

filed

in

1965,

and water

appropriation

defendants

showed

the

property line to be where staked by Bush & Gudgell in
1962 rather than where defendants placed their fence
in 1979.
3.

Findings, 1f 31.
Even defendants' own trial survey, performed

in 1983, showed that defendants' fence

intruded

plaintiff's property by at least 20 feet.
1f 36.

on

Findings,

When defendants' surveyor specifically informed

them of this fact in 1983, they continued to defend
this action on the basis that their fence established
the property line. Id.

4.

In 1984 defendants compounded their abuse of

plaintiffs

property

rights

after

this

action

was

filed, by depositing fill dirt near the fence, knowing
that the survey they would offer at trial showed that
the fill dirt was also placed
erty.

on plaintiff's prop-

Findings, 1f 30.

Notwithstanding

these

findings,

the

trial

court

refused to award punitive damages and refused to award attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953) "as a
matter of law" on the basis that defendants' conduct was not
"willful

and

malicious."

Tr.

496

et

seq.

While,

unlike

defendants, plaintiff does not quarrel with the trial court's
evaluation of the evidence, plaintiff
lower

court

committed

an error of

does contend

law

that the

in failing to apply

recent decisions of this Court awarding punitive damages based
on a "reckless disregard" standard.
In Terry v. Z.C.M. I. , 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), this
Court held that punitive damages may be awarded against one who
acts with reckless indifference and disregard of the law and
his

fellow

citizens.

punitive damages for
lifter under

Defendant
false

this standard.

Z.C.M.I.

imprisonment
The Court

was

assessed

with

of an alleged shopreferred

to the new

standard as "implied malice" or "malice in law," 605 P.2d at
327.

Cf^, McFarland v. Skaqgs, 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984) indi-

cating that Terry can no longer be applied in false imprisonment - shoplifting cases.
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Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah
1982) applied this standard

for punitive damages

factually similar to the case at hand.

in a case

In Branch, the plain-

tiff sued his neighbor for trespass, nuisance, and negligence.
The defendant neighbor, a small oil company, had allowed its
waste water to seep into the ground, contaminating plaintiff's
culinary water supply.

The jury rendered a verdict in plain-

tiff's favor on the basis of nuisance.

In addition to compen-

satory damages, punitive damages were assessed.
defendant

challenged

On appeal, the

the award of punitive damages, arguing

that "punitive damages are appropriate only when willful and
malicious conduct is shown, and that the [Trial] Court erred in
including the phrase 'reckless indifference and disregard' in
its instruction on punitive damages," 657 P.2d at 277.
Court

rejected

that

argument,

finding

the

"reckless disregard" instruction to be proper.
Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d

293

(Utah

trial

This

court's

See also, Leigh

1982) and Behrens v.

Raleigh Hills Hospital, 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983).
Even

if it is true

that

the

defendants

here were

uncertain as to the exact location of the property line when
they erected their fence in 1979, they were certain that the
fence was on the wrong side of that line.

They were just as

certain in 1984 when they deposited the fill dirt, after this
action was already underway and they had been advised of the
results of the Stercke survey.

At best, such conduct must be

deemed

as a matter of law under the

"reckless

indifference"

above cases.

Similarly, defendants' have continued to defend

the trespass claim, both before the trial court and this Court,
with knowledge since at least 1983 that the survey they would
offer at trial would itself prove the trespass.

Such defense

must be deemed "without merit and not brought or asserted in
good

faith" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56

(1953), as a matter of law,
IV.

THE COST AWARD WAS WITHIN THE TRIAL
COURT'S DISCRETION.

The trial court's cost award is contained in a Minute
Entry dated March 6, 1985 and subsequent Order dated May 7,
1985.

Neither

of these documents

are now contained

in the

record on appeal, nor have defendants made any attempt yet to
designate them as such.
More important, defendants admit at page 24 of their
brief that the amount of a cost award is within the discretion
of

the

entirely

trial
clear

court.
on

While

the

this

limits

of

Court's decisions
this

discretion

are not
[compare

Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P. 2d 771 (Utah 1980), relied upon by
defendants, with Thomas v. Children's Aid Society of Ogden, 12
Utah

2d

235, 364

P. 2d

1029

(1961)],

any

doubts

about the

equitable scope of this discretion should be resolved in the
trial court's favor.

See, Decorso v. Thomas, 89 Utah 160, 50

P.2d 951, reh. den., 89 Utah 179, 57 P.2d 1406 (1936).
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The only cost at issue here is the cost of one of
plaintiff's several trial surveys.

As set forth in the trial

court's May 7, 1985 Order, this particular survey was found to
have been "necessary" for the trial court's determination of
the exact location of the common boundary line.

Such a finding

distinguishes this case from Frampton, Stratford v. Wood, 11
Utah 2d 251, 358 P.2d 80 (1961), and similar decisions purporting to limit the award of costs incurred in trial preparation.

See also, Davis v. Davis, 111 Utah 324, 178 P.2d 394

(1947).

Of course, the reason the survey was "necessary" was

because

of

defendants'

reckless

indifference

location of the boundary, over-reaching

self

to
help,

the
and

faith defenses to the trespass claim, as argued above.
also, Findings, 1f1f 19, 27, 18, 30, 31, 36, 44.

true
bad
See

If there was

ever a case in which such an award was called for, this is that
case, especially where the award was made "necessary" by defendants' own misconduct.
CONCLUSION
While some cases

are deceptive in their complexity,

this case is deceptive in its simplicity.

The factual issue

before the trial court was where E. G. Swenson commenced Little
Mountain Subdivision No. 2.

Knowing

from their

own surveys

that they could not hope to prevail on this issue, defendants
have attempted to mislead both the trial court and this Court
with sophistry about "lost" and "obliterated" government monuments.

These attempts failed in the trial court and must fail

here as well.

Plaintiff's
subdivision

was

evidence

regarding

straightforward,

the

consistent

location
with

of

the

the

legal

standards argued by defendants, and consistent as well with the
relevant public and private surveys and the "fit" of the subdivision in question.

It was only defendants' evidence that

failed to meet the factual and legal standards that they argue
apply, and even this evidence established
pass.

As

necessary
resolve

the

trial

court

for plaintiff
the

confusion

also

to

found,

incur

the

engendered

trespass and faulty evidence.

by

defendants'
defendants

cost

of

a

tres-

made

it

survey

to

defendants'

knowing

The only error by the district

court was a legal one in failing to award punitive damages and
attorneys'

fees based

on these

findings,

and

upon

findings

showing that defendants' denial of the trespass was known to be
meritless.
This

second guess the trial

court's

evaluation of the evidence and exercise of discretion.

Accord-

ingly,

Court

plaintiff

affirmed

on the

may

urges

not

that

the

trial

court's

judgment

be

issues of trespass, location of the common

boundary and award of costs.

On the other hand, this Court

must reverse the trial court's legal error in failing to award
punitive damages and attorneys' fees based upon the findings.
Accordingly, plaintiff also urges that this Court remand for
the

sole

purpose

of

directing
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that

punitive

damages

and

attorneys' fees, including

fees

incurred on this appeal, be

awarded as a matter of law, in an amount to be determined by
.'-TT

the district court.
DATED this

u

-

day of June, 1985.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

John S. Chindlund

By \JTl^

U?4. Y^7

-l ~^<

James A. Bbevers
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
_JBAILING CERTIFICATE
On this jjj

day of June, 1985, I hereby certify that

I caused four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
RESPONDENT to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Roy G. Haslam
Paul D. Veasy
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
John Walsh
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants
Suite 202, Cove Point Plaza
3865 South Wasatch Boulevard
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

5056G

